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Article 6

THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES AS IT RELATES
TO POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
Lawrence Berger*
Over the past twenty-five years, much has been written about
the raison d'etre of the Rule Against Perpetuities. 1 During this
period, the theories underlying and the justifications posited
for the Rule have changed considerably, while some of the older
notions concerning it have been partially discredited. The purpose of this article is to utilize some of these newly arrived at
basics and apply them specifically to the problem of the Rule
as it relates to powers of appointment. In the course of the discussion, a cursory review of the history of the Rule and its policy
progenitors is undertaken for background purposes; and in addition, the newer thinking about the Rule is broadly outlined.
Finally, an evaluation of the legal principles in light of these
newer policy justifications for the Rule is attempted.
I. THE BASIC STRUGGLE AND ITS RELATION
TO THE RULE
The history of English real property law is marked by a
struggle between the landowner, who was constantly seeking to
perpetuate control over his property far beyond his own death,
and the courts who in opposition tried to keep these activities
within reasonable bounds.2 It is thought that originally a conveyance "to A and his heirs" created an interest in A's heirs
which could not be barred by A without the consent of his heir
apparent. In 1225, the court changed this rule in D' Arundel's
Case3 so that the heirs could no longer prevent an alienation.
* B.S. in Econ., 1949, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1952, Rutgers

University; Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska.
1 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, Introductory Note 2129-33 (1944);
3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 762 (1952); MoRmIs & LEACH, THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES 13-18 (1956); Fraser, The Rationale of the Rule

Against Perpetuities, 6 MnIN. L. Rrv. 560 (1922); Simes, The Policy

Against Perpetuities,103 U. PA. L. REV. 707 (1955); Schuyler, Should
2

the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard Its Vest, 56 Mlcu. L. REv. 683,
688 (1958).
7 HoLDSWORTEI, HISTORY OF ENGLISn LAW 193 (1926); RESTATEMENT,

PROPERTY, Introductory Note 2123-29 (1944).
3 BRACTON's NoTE BOOK 1054.
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This was probably the first judicial strike at the fettering of
property. The conveyancers then started using the device of a
gift "to A and the heirs of his body" to assure that A's heirs took.
The eventual reply of the courts was that such a limitation created
a fee simple conditional and that after A had issue born, he could
convey a fee simple absolute. 4 It was then that Parliament interjected itself into the conflict on the side of the landowner and
the fettering of property, doubtless because the landowning barons
controlled Parliament. In 1285, it enacted the Statute De Donis 5
which provided that in such a conveyance the heirs could recover the property from the ancestor's grantee after the ancestor's
death; if there were no heirs of the body or there were an indefinite failure of issue, the estate reverted to the grantor in fee.
This, of course, was the beginning of the estate fee tail.
Around 200 years later, the courts again showed their penchant
for freedom from fettered alienability in Taltarum's Case,6 in
which it was held that a tenant in tail could bar the entail by
common recovery and thus effectively convey an estate in fee
7
simple absolute.
The history of the Rule Against Perpetuities is marked by
a similar struggle. The holdings in two early seventeenth century cases, Mannings Case" and Pells v. Brown, precipitated the
invention and evolution of the Rule. These cases held that the
executory interest, the new type of future interest permitted at
law by the Statute of Uses, was indestructible. This ran counter
to the court's long standing policy fostering alienability and was
in substantial opposition to the rule of destructibility of contingent remainders.1 0 It should be noted that had it been decided
4

3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 112, 113 (1923).

5 13 Edw. 1, c. 1.

6 Y.B. 12 Edw. IV, 19 (1472).
7

Other areas of similar conflict could be mentioned, e.g., the Rule in
Shelley's Case and the Doctrine of Worthier Title. See RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY, Introductory Note 2123-29 (1944).

8 8 Co. Rep. 94b, 77 Eng. Rep. 618 (K.B. 1609).
9 Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (K.B. 1620).
10 This is the rule that says that a contingent remainder is destroyed

unless it vests at or before the termination of the particular freehold
estate preceding it. Thus in the gift from A to B for life, remainder
to C if he survives D, C's remainder is destroyed if D is still alive

when B dies. Contingent remainders could also be artificially destroyed by forfeiture of the preceding life estate or merger of the life
estate in the next vested estate of freehold.
TURE INTERESTS §§ 193-209 (1956).

See SnvIMs &

SMITH,

Fu-
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that executory interests were similarly destructible, the Rule
Against Perpetuities probably would never have evolved. It was
the presence of these judicially created and potentially infinite
fetterings that pushed the courts toward the reasonable limitation of future interests. In 1685, this process, began with the
Duke of Norfolk's Case," the first decision in which the courts
started groping toward the Rule Against Perpetuities. The basic
outlines of the Rule were perhaps not complete for almost 200
years, and the evolution continues to this day with many suggestions being currently advanced for improvement. 12
II.

THE RATIONALE OF THE RULE

Of more immediate concern in this article is the change in
the way the Rule has been justified through the years. Historically, the Rule has been rationalized by courts and text writers
as an effectuation of the broad social policy in favor of the productive use of property.1 3 It was thought that property could be
kept productive if it were freely alienable, and that inalienable
property was likely to be unproductive. Professor Simes in his
recent writings 14 traces this development, admitting the validity
of these theories for the period when they were formulated but
rejecting them for modern application. He states three basic
reasons why alienability for productivity is no longer applicable
as a rationale in the United States.
[F]irst . . . future interests are nearly always equitable interests

in trusts and the trustees, in most cases, will have, either by the
terms of the trust or by law, a power to sell and reinvest; second,
if the future interests are in corporate stock or in corporate or government bonds, the corporation will make the property productive,
or the governmental authority will use the borrowed capital for
social benefit

. .

. [third], by the weight of authority, in America,

11 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1682).

12 For an excellent summary of most of the criticisms and suggestions

for improvement see Schuyler, Should The Rule Against Perpetuities
Discard Its Vest, 56 MICH. L. REv. 683, 693-726 (1958). For more detailed criticisms the following materials are indispensable: MoRuus &
LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (1956); SinVEs, PUBLIC POLICY
AND THE DEAD HAND (1955); Leach, Perpetuities:Staying the Slaughter
of the Innocents, 68 L.Q. REV. 35 (1952); Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HAav. L. REv. 721

(1952); Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed, 52 MicH. L.
REv. 179 (1953).
13 See GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUrES § 4 (4th ed. 1942); Snwrs,
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 33-36 (1955).
14 SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND T=E DEAD HAND (1955); Simes, The Policy
Against Perpetuities,103 U. PA. L. REV. 707 (1955).
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if there are legal future interests in land affected with a future
interest and an emergency has arisen whereby the property is likely
to be lost because it is unproductive, the court can order a sale of
the land and a productive investment of the proceeds by a trustee
....*15

If alienability to secure productivity is its sole purpose, "then
we have reached a point when the Rule should be completely
abolished."' 6 But this is not the sole purpose of the Rule at all.
First it "strikes a fair balance between the desires of members
of the present generation, and similar desires of succeeding generations, to do what they wish with the property which they
enjoy;"'1 7 and second, it serves the socially desirable end "that
be controlled by its living members and
the wealth of the world
8
not by the dead."'
Both of these arguments, it would seem, go to the same basic
idea; that is, the avoidance of excessive control of property by
the dead. It might well be asked what policy or policies underlie
that principle. This is a question which is not so easily disposed
of other than by the intuitive and most unsatisfactory circular
answer that it just is not sound policy to allow the dead an unlimited right to control the property of the living. Simes might
pose other answers as well: (1) that properties subject to future
interests are mostly in trust funds and that a trustee is not generally allowed to invest in risk capital, the backbone of our economic expansion; (2) that trust funds cannot be used for consumption but only for capital investment, and (3) that a condition attached to a gift can unreasonably control human conduct
into the indefinite future. 19 Perhaps I might pose a fourth: that
the dead hand cannot possibly predict far into the future, especially in this era of rapidly advancing technology, and to allow
property to be bound to certain people indefinitely might result
in the inefficient utilization of the wealth of society in ways that
we cannot even foretell as yet.
Whatever formal justifications can be posed, it is clear that
there is a consensus among most writers that the dead hand
Simes states
15 SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 53 (1955).
that two additional factors are present in England: (1) The Law of
Property Act of 1925 which gives some persons the power to sell a
legal fee even though there are contingent interests outstanding and
(2) the English Town and Country Planning Act of 1947, which provides that private unproductive land can be taken by compulsory process for more productive use.
16 Ibid.
17 SIMES, op. cit. supra note 15, at 58.
18 SIMES, op. cit. supra note 15, at 59.
'9 SIMES, op. cit. supra note 15, at 60-62.
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should not rule forever over the disposition of
submitted then, that the legal rules relating to
lems should be in consonance with this basic
tion.21 An attempt to see whether this is true
appointment area follows.

property.20 It is
perpetuities probpolicy considerain the powers of

III. THE LEGAL RULES IN GENERAL
There are at least three different areas in which the Rule
Against Perpetuities is said to apply to the power of appointment:
first and most important, where the interest created by the exercise of the power may not vest within the period of the Rule;
second, where the power itself may be exercised outside the
period of the Rule, and third, where the exercise of the power
is subject to a condition precedent which may occur outside the
period of the Rule. The second and third areas involve the application of the Rule Against Perpetuities to the power itself, and
the first involves the application of the Rule to the interest
created by the exercise of the power. The above areas will be
considered seriatim.

20 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY,

REAL PROPERTY

Introductory Note 2129-33 (1944); 5

POWELL,

§ 762 (1956); Momus & LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PER-

16 (1956).
Professors Morris and Leach in their work opine that the Rule
can best be justified on the theory that it strikes a balance between the
desires of present and future generations to control property.
The Restatement, supra, suggests another justification for the
'Rule in that it aids the competitive struggle by preventing persons
less fit from retaining property disproportionate to their skills.
Of course there is a vast literature written by economists of the
early twentieth century and earlier philosophers on whether there
should be testation at all. See, e.g., READ, THE ABOLITION Or INmERITANCE (1919); CARVER, The Question of Inheritance, in ESSAYS IN SOCIAL
JUSTICE 304-23 (1915); SEDGwicK, FREEDOM OF BEQUEST, quoted in
WIGMoRE & KOcOuREK, RATIONAL BASIS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 445
(1923); McMurray, Liberty of Testation and Some Modern Limitations Thereon, 14 ILL. L. REv. 96 (1920). The last article cited contains an excellent summary of the views of such assorted thinkers as
PETuTS

Maine, Grotius, Pufendorf, Blackstone, Mirabeau and Plato.
is clear that dead hand control is almost eliminated by making

21 It

property fully alienable in the hands of one living person and the law
is equally clear that if property is so alienable there is no violation
of the Rule. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 363 (1944); 5 POWELL, REAL
PROPERTY § 767 nn.32-41 (1956); SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS §§
1249-55 (1956). See also Fraser, The Rationale of the Rule Against
Perpetuities,6 MINN. L. REv. 560 (1922).
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A. REMOTENESS OF THE APPOINTED INTEREST -SPECIAL
GENERAL TESTAMENTARY

AND

PowERs

22
Generally, no interest created by the exercise of a valid
special or general testamentary power is good unless it must
vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in
being at the time of the creation of the power. 23 Circumstances
may be viewed as of the time of the exercise of the power, however, to determine whether an appointment is void under the
Rule.24 Thus, if A devises property to B for life, remainder to
such relatives of B as B by deed or will appoints, and B appoints
by deed to his child C (unborn at A's death) for life, remainder
to C's first son (who is as yet unborn), the remainder to C's first
son is void. It is void because C was not alive at A's death and
the interest in C's first son, therefore, may not vest within twentyone years after the death of B, who is the life in being. However, if C's first son were already born at the time of the appointment, his remainder would be good, because even though
the period of the Rule is counted from the creation of the power
(at A's death), the actual circumstances at the time of the appointment are looked to, and, in this case, the interest of C's
first son vested at the time of the appointment.
The rule that circumstances are viewed as of the time of the
appointment is, perhaps, in opposition to the basic doctrine of
the Rule Against Perpetuities, of looking not to what has happened after the creation of the interest, but only to what may

happen viewed at the time of the creation of the interest.

If the

latter were the rule, then all general, and most special, powers
would be void because a remote appointment might possibly be
made within the terms of the power granted. It makes eminently
good sense to "wait and see" what appointment is made and consider the actual circumstances that exist at that time. This was
the rule long before Professor Leach proposed that the "wait and
22 The word "valid" as used here means valid under the Rule as applied
to the power itself. See discussion at note 44 infra.
23 Special Powers: In re Boyd's Estate, 199 Pa. 487, 49 Atl. 297 (1901);

Graham v. Whitridge, 99 Md. 248, 57 Atl. 609, 58 Atl. 36 (1904).
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 514-22

GRAY,

(4th ed. 1942).

General testamentary powers: Minot v. Paine, 230 Mass. 514, 120
N.E. 167, 1 A.L.R. 365 (1918); Gambrill v. Gambrill, 122 Md. 563, 89
Atl. 1094 (1914); SnIEs & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1275 n.89 (1956)
and cases therein cited.
24 Marx v. Rice, 3 N.J. Super. 581, 67 A.2d 918 (App. Div. 1949); 6 AMERICA LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.35 (Casner ed. 1952); SIMES & SMITH, FuTURE INTERESTS § 1274 n.85 (1956)

and cases therein cited.
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see" concept
be extended to Rule Against Perpetuities problems
25
generally.
B.

REmOTENESS OF THE APPOINTED INTEREST-GENERAL
PRESENTLY EXERCISABLE

PoWER

No interest created by the exercise of a valid general power
presently exercisable is good unless it must vest, if at all, not
later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the time
of the appointment.26 Thus if A devises property to B for life,
remainder to whom B appoints by deed or will, and B appoints
by deed to his son C (unborn at A's death) for life, remainder
to C's first son, the remainder to C's first son is valid. It is valid
because in determining the validity of an interest created by the
exercise of a general power presently exercisable, the period of
the Rule Against Perpetuities is counted from the time of the
exercise of the power, and at the time of the exercise C was a
life in being. This, of course, is in contrast to the Rule in relation to special and general testamentary powers where the period
is computed from the time of the creation of the power. 27
The significant distinction is between general powers presently exercisable and all other powers, of which much has been
written. The basic lines of the argument were laid down about
fifty years ago in a well known debate between Professors John
Chipman Gray of Harvard and Albert M. Kales of Northwestern.2 8
Gray's position basically was that the key question in all cases
is whether the donee of the power is "practically the owner" of
the property. If he is, then the period of the Rule should be
computed from the time of the exercise of the power. Gray went
on to say that the donee of a general power presently exercisable
is "practically the owner," but the donee of a general testamentary
power is not.
[W]hen he [the donor] gives a testamentary power, he distinctly
means that the donee shall have only a delegated authority; he
does not mean at any time, or on the performance of any condition, to make a gift to the donee himself. When there is a power
by deed given, the creator of the power means that at some time
or on some condition the donee shall have in substance the fee.
25 See note 12 supra.
26 Mifflins' Appeal, 121 Pa. 205, 15 Atl. 525, 1 L.R.A. 453 (1888); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 391 (1944); SnwEs & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS

§ 1274 (1956).
27 See text accompanying note 23 supra.
28 Kales, General Powers and the Rule Against Perpetuities,26 HARv. L.

REv. 64 (1912); Gray, General Testamentary Powers and the Rule
Against Perpetuities,26 HAIv. L. REv. 720 (1913).
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as distinctly
When a testamentary power is given, the creator
29
means that the donee shall never have the fee.
Professor Kales agreed that the test of "practically the owner"
was the true one but disagreed on its application.
Mr. Gray insists that the donee is not "practically the owner;
he cannot appoint to himself; he is, indeed, the only person to
whom he cannot possibly appoint, for he must die before the
transfer of the property can take place." When Mr. Gray says the
donee cannot appoint to himself so as to enjoy the property during his life, we must agree with him. It follows inevitably that
during the life of the donee he is not practically the owner. If
this is what Mr. Gray means when he says that the donee is not
"practically the owner," all must agree. But is that the important inquiry? Is it not essential to determine whether at the moment of exercising the general power the donee is practically the
owner? For instance, if a donee were given a general power to
appoint by deed or will when he reached thirty or married, it
would be stupid to say that he was not practically the owner before he reached thirty or married, and, therefore, could not be
practically the owner when he reached that age or married ...
In short, our real inquiry must be, is the donee with a general
will only practically the owner at the mopower to appoint 3by
0
ment of his death.
Kales, in effect, went on to say that at the very instant of
death there is only one incident of ownership, namely the power
to dispose of the property. This incident the donee of a general
testamentary power has. He is practically the owner of the property, therefore, and all general powers should be treated alike
31
for the purpose of computing the period of the Rule.
Since Gray and Kales explored the problem others have
joined in, some on Gray's side, 32 others following Professor Kales'
position. 33 As a result, however, of Gray's writings and his tremendous influence in this area, most American courts classified
the general testamentary power with the special power for the
Gray, supra note 28, at 722.
30 Kales, supra note 28, at 66-67.
29

31 Ibid.
Foulke, Powers and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 16 CoLmvI. L. REV.
537, 642 (1916); SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1275 (1956);
MoRRIs & LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 138-40 (1956).
33 Gold, General Testamentary Powers and the Rule Against Perpetuities,
58 L.Q. Rev. 400, 416 (1942); Thorndike, General Powers and Perpetuities, 27 HARV. L. REV. 705, 714 (1914); Bettner, The Rule Against
Perpetuitiesas Applied to Powers of Appointment, 27 VA. L. REV. 149,
176-77 (1940); Droop, Powers in Relation to the Rule Against Perpetuities, 71 L.Q. Rev. 242, 250 (1955).

32
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purpose of computing the period of the Rule34 though the English

rule is the other way.35
Professors Simes and Smith in their treatise justify Gray's
position in a slightly different manner:

[F]rom a practical standpoint the position of the donee of a general power to appoint by will is very different from that of the
donee of a power to appoint by deed. Wills are not, as a rule,
commercial transactions. And the fact that a man has an unrestricted power to appoint property by will does not mean that he
is likely to put the property on the market and sell it. The very
fact that he is limited to a disposition by will means that he will
probably dispose of it to members of his family or to charities by
way of gift. The property, during the existence of this power, is,
from a practical standpoint, removed from commerce. And it is
proper, in determining remoteness, to count the period from the
creation and not from the exercise of the power. 36
There are some criticisms that might be leveled at the SimesSmith position. It would seem that the basic test proposed here
-whether property is removed from commerce-smacks of the
traditional rationale of the Rule Against Perpetuities, alienability
for productivity, which Professor Simes himself so ably and con37
It
vincingly refuted as a current raison d'etre of the Rule.
would, perhaps, have been more appropriate to analyze the problem from the point of view of the modern justification of the
38
Rule, the freeing of property from the control of the dead hand.
An attempt to do so is made here through consideration of the
following closely related fact situations.
(1) The Fee SimpZe. A devises Blackacre to (or bequeaths
a fund in trust for) his son B and his heirs. B by will leaves
the property to his son X for life, remainder to X's oldest surviving son.
34

Cleveland Trust Co. v. McQuade, 106 Ohio App. 237, 142 N.E.2d 249
(1957); SrMEs & SMr, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1275 n.89 (1956) and cases
therein cited.

Contra, Miller v. Douglas, 192 Wis. 486, 213 N.W. 320

(1927).
35
36

37
38

Rous v. Jackson, 29 Ch. D. 521, 52 L.T.R. (n.s.) 733 (1885).
SnwEs & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1275, at 214 (1956).

See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
There is another but unimportant criticism that might be leveled as
well. When a man has a testamentary power, it is not just "unlikely"
that he will put the property on the market and sell it. Under American law it is well nigh impossible, for the cases say that contracts to
exercise a testamentary power are unenforcible either by way of a
suit for damages or for specific performance. Northern Trust Co. v.
Porter, 368 ll. 256, 13 N.E.2d 487 (1938); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 340
(1940).
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(2) The General Power Presently Exercisable. A devises
Blackacre to (or bequeaths a fund in trust for) his son B for life,
remainder as B appoints by deed or will and in default of appointment to Y and hip heirs. B appoints to his son X (who was
not alive at A's death) for life, remainder to X's oldest surviving
son.
(3) The General Testamentary Power. A devises Blackacre
to (or bequeaths a fund in trust for) his son B for life, remainder
as B appoints by will and in default of appointment to Y and
his heirs. B by will appoints to his son X (who was not alive
at A's death) for life, remainder to X's oldest surviving son.
(4) The Special Power. A devises Blackacre to (or bequeaths a fund in trust for) his son B for life, remainder to such
of B's relatives as B by deed or will (or by will) appoints and
in default of appointment to Y and his heirs. B appoints to his
son X (who was not alive at A's death) for life, remainder to X's
oldest surviving son.
(5) Immediate Creation of Remote Future Interest. A devises Blackacre to (or bequeaths a fund in trust for) his son B
for life, remainder to B's oldest surviving son for life, remainder
to said son's oldest surviving son.
It is, of course, readily apparent that in each example A's
grandson, and A's unascertained great grandson get the same interest-in the first four examples, by means of a two step process
in which B plays a most crucial and indeed indispensable role,
and in the last example, by means of a one step process in which
A is the only effective agent. These examples run the gamut
from the least possible to the most complete in attempted control by A of the future disposition of the property; and as a result, the law holds the gifts to the unascertained great grandson
void in some and valid in other cases.
In example (1), A has given B the fee and B independently has tied the property up to his son and grandson, a process,
needless to say, universally conceded to be unobjectionable from
the point of view of the Rule Against Perpetuities. 39 In example
(5), on the other hand, A has attempted independently to tie the
property up so that neither his son nor grandson can effectively
control it, and the fee goes to the unborn great grandson. The
last interest purportedly given is void because B's oldest surviving son may not be a life in being at A's death.40 In both cases
A's great grandson gets the same interest and the property is in
39 See MoRRis & LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 2 (1956).
40 GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES ch.

VI (4th ed. 1942).
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the family the same length of time. The objectionable feature
in (5) is not that property is actually kept in the family for too
long a time, but that the property is so limited that no living
person can control it free of the dead hand within the period of
the Rule.
In like manner, let us examine cases (2), (a and (4). In
(2), B has a life estate and a general power presently exercisable;
he can appoint to himself at any time and thus become the owner
in fee. Is it therefore correct to say that all elements of dead
hand control have been eliminated? Not really, because if B
chooses not to exercise the power at all, the property will pass
to the taker in default, in accordance with A's original gift. Nevertheless, it is universally accepted that the validity of the gift is
measured by counting from the time of exercise of the power
on the theory that at any time B can make the property freely
alienable, just by exercising the power. 41 But it should be noted
that if and until B does exercise the power, there is a measure
of dead hand control over the disposition of the property which
the courts say is irrelevant because of B's absolute power of disposition in the meantime.
In case (4), in which B has a life estate with a special power,
the element of dead hand control is more evident. B cannot
make the property his own and is confined to an appointment
among a certain named class. From this, it can most convincingly be argued, and the law clearly is, that in such a situation
the period of the Rule should be computed from A's death, that
instant in time when the property is first fettered. 42 The gift to
X's unascertained son is therefore void.
The problem, as already noted, comes in case (3) where B
has a life estate and a general testamentary power. To what
extent has A released his after death hold upon the property?
It is, of course, clear that he has released it to a lesser extent than
in (2) and to a greater extent than in (4). The problem in (3) lies
clearly in the difficult middle area. It has already been shown
that there are times when some measure of dead*hand control is
deemed not to involve the running of the Rule Against Perpetuities; that is, in a case where one person has the power to make
the property fully alienable. Here A has given B as much as he
possibly could without actually giving B the means of obtaining
the entire ownership. He has given B beneficial ownership for
life and a power at death to dispose of the property completely
41
42

See note 26 supra.
See note 23 supra.
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free of A's control of who gets the property and what interest
can be given. At B's death, A's last restraining fetter is broken.
For that reason, it would seem that Professor Kales' position is
correct. Since the control of the dead hand has been effectively
destroyed within the period of the Rule, there is no reason to
count the period preceding that destruction as an objectionable
fetter upon the property. The period of the Rule should be computed from the time of the exercise of the power, the time when
the fetter is reapplied.
It might be asked whether the result would be different if
B does not have a life estate but merely has a collateral testamentary power.43 It would seem the result should be the same.
In such a case the property would also be completely free of the
dead hand at the time the power is exercised.
C.

POSSIBLE EXERCISE OUTSIDE

THE PERIOD OF THE RULE

Where a special or general testamentary power of appointment may be exercised outside the period of the Rule, the power
is said to be void or incapable of effective exercise. 44 Thus, if A
devises Blackacre to his son B (who has no children) for life,
then to B's oldest surviving son for life, remainder as B's oldest
surviving son should appoint by will, the power is bad because
B's oldest surviving son may not be a life in being at A's death
and B's son may exercise his testamentary power more than
twenty-one years after B's death.
On the other hand, if the power is general and presently exercisable, it is good if it may be exercised within the period of
43

"Where the donee of a power of appointment has no other interest in
the thing with respect to which the power exists the power is said to
be collateral." 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.12, at 493 (Casner

44

Webb v. Sadler, L.R. 14 Eq. 533 (1872), L.R. 8 Ch. App. 419 (1873);
(1944); SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 390(2)

ed. 1952).

INTERESTS §

1273 (1956).

Historically there has been some conflict as to whether a power
that violates this rule is itself void or merely incapable of being effectively exercised. Professor Gray took the position that only the estate
created by the exercise of the power was voided by the operation of
the Rule. GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 474.1 (4th ed. 1942).
But Gray's son disagreed. Id. § 479.2. The Restatement follows the
argument of the elder Gray on the theory that the Rule operates only
against future interests and a power is not a future interest. RESTATEProfessor Powell agrees.
MENT, PROPERTY § 390, comment b (1944).
On the other hand, many
5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 786 (1956).
authorities take the position that the power itself is void. SnwES &
SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 1272-73 (1956); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY §§ 24.31-.32 (Casner ed. 1952).
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the Rule.45 In the above example, then, the power, if changed
to one presently exercisable would be good because it is possible
for B's oldest son to exercise it within twenty-one years of B's
death. It is clear also that when a power is given to a living
natural person, the power may not violate the Rule because it
cannot possibly be exercised outside the perpetuities period.40
In this area, less has been written about the problem of the
distinction between general powers presently exercisable and general testamentary powers than in the area of the remoteness of
the appointment itself. But the principles are the same. If the
questions in this area are one of degree, then the inquiry must
be to the extent that dead hand control has been relaxed in the
particular disposition involved. In the above example, is there
any justification for saying, on the one hand that the general
testamentary power is bad if it may be exercised outside the
period of the Rule, but the general power presently exercisable
is good if it may be exercised within the period? The justification often given is that in the case of the power presently exercisable the donee has the authority to make the property his own,
and if he can do this within the period of the Rule, there is no
fetter upon alienability or dead hand control and the policy of
the Rule Against Perpetuities is not violated.47 But this is not
true, the argument runs, in the case of the general testamentary
power because there the donee of the power cannot make the
property his own and so terminate dead hand control. He cannot
eliminate the dead hand until he dies exercising the testamentary power, and he may die outside the period of the Rule. And
even if he happens to die within the period, this fact is not within
his control. There is then no one person who can terminate all
fetters upon alienability within the period of the Rule just by
the exercise of his volition. Of course, it might be argued that
it is within the donee's volition. At any time before the expiration of the period of the Rule he may opt to commit suicide and
leave a will exercising the power. Realistically and practically
viewed, this argument falls. Rare is the donee who would exercise this "option." During the period of the donee's life, then,
it would seem that there is an objectionable fetter upon the
property and the rule as generally enunciated is sound.
45

Bray v. Bree, 2 C1. & F. 453, 6 Eng. Rep. 1225 (1834);
PROPERTY § 390(1) (1944).

RESTATEMENT,

46 See Snms & Smrm, FuTuRE INTRESTS § 1272 n.77 (1956)

therein cited.
47 Gray, TBE RULE AGAINST PERPETUrTIEs § 477 (4th ed. 1942).

and cases
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D. POWER

SUBJECT TO A CONDITION PRECEDENT

The text authorities almost universally accept the doctrine
that if the exercise of a power is subject to a condition precedent
which may not occur within the period of the Rule as counted
from the creation of the power, the power is invalid or incapable
of effective exercise. 48 This is true whether the power is general
or special, testamentary or presently exercisable. For example,
suppose A devises property in trust for B for life, remainder to
B's first daughter (unborn at the time of A's death) for life, subject to a general power by deed or will in B's first daughter to
be exercised only after her marriage. Such a power would be
invalid because the marriage of B's first daughter might take
place more than twenty-one years after the death of B, the life
in being. As noted, this rule applies even to the general power
presently exercisable. The reason for this is clear. Until the
contingency occurs, there is no one person who can by the exercise of his volition terminate all fetters upon the property. In
the case above, for example, B's daughter cannot free the property from the bonds created by A unless and until she marries.
Her marriage is subject not only to the exercise of her own volition but also the acquiescing volition of a male. The power,
void. The few cases on this subject seem to
therefore, would 4be
9
follow this view.

One limitation of this rule should be noted. If the power on
condition precedent is given solely to a living natural person, the

power would be valid because it must of necessity be exercised
during the life of the donee of the power, the life in being.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Rule Against Perpetuities has as its basic purpose the
elimination of dead hand control beyond a precisely measurable
period. Perpetuities problems should, therefore, be approached
from the point of view of determining whether there is an unbreakable dead hand control. The key to whether a power of

appointment "tolls" the running of the Rule should be found by
answering this question:

Can that control be broken during the

48 GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

& SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS

786 (1956);

§

1272

§ 474.3 (4th ed. 1942); SInvES

(1956);

RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY

5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY §

§ 390(1)

(1944).

49 See, e.g., Morgan v. Gronow, L.R. 16 Eq. 1, 28 L.T.R. (n.s.) 434 (1873).
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period of the Rule? If it can, such control is not offensive to the
Rule Against Perpetuities. 50

50 The acceptance of this view would also change the Rule from one
against remoteness of vesting in interest to a rule against remoteness
of possession. For example take the gift from A to B for life, then to
B's oldest surviving son for life, remainder to C in fee. Under present
rules the gift to C is valid because it is vested though C (or his heirs)
never may enjoy it within lives in being and twenty-one years. (In
such a case, of course, it is probably C's heirs or devisees who will
finally take).
But if the Rule is viewed as one proscribing dead hand control
outside the period of the Rule then the gift to C would be void. The
Rule then would require a certainty of possession within the period.
Others have suggested the possibility of such an approach. See SimEs,
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 80 (1955); Schuyler, Should the
Rule Against PerpetuitiesDiscard Its Vest, 56 MicH. L. REV. 683 (1958).

